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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
EXEMPTIONS FROM.JURY SERVICE AND CHALLENGES
FOR CAUSE IN MISSOURI*
BY ROBERT E. ROSENWALD
I. INTRODUCTION
The common law of England is the fundamental law of Amer-
ican jurisprudence. It is the foundation of the law of Missouri.
Of peculiar significance is the fact that in two identical congres-
sional acts of 1804 and 1805, trial by jury was established in the
territory out of which the State of Missouri later was carved.1
And it was not until 1812 that Congress enacted a law provid-
ing that the people of Missouri Territory should always be en-
titled to judicial proceedings according to the common law.?
The General Assembly of the Territory of Missouri adopted the
common law of England in 1816.3 While trial by jury is a very
vital feature of that law, it is remarkable that Congress pro-
vided for jury trial even before establishing the common law.
The laws concerning exemptions from jury service and chal-
lenges for cause seem to have become firmly established and well
crystallized. Objectively viewed, the jury in this state presents
a most disorganized and disheveled appearance. When it is re-
called that the legislature has enacted five laws, one of which
exempts clergymen from jury duty throughout the state,4 an-
other which exempts them in cities having a population over
100,000, 5 a third which exempts them in cities having a popula-
tion over 500,000,6 a fourth which disqualifies them in counties
having a population from 60,000 to 200,000,7 and a fifth which
disqualifies them in counties having a population from 200,000
to 400,000,8 there is clear proof of a lack of scientific method in
jury legislation. When it is found that a juror who within the
period of six months preceding a trial has been in the employ of
a corporation with which during the same period an attorney in
* The writer acknowledges his indebtedness to Dr. Arnold J. Lien, head
of the Department of Political Science of Washington University, for his
guidance in the preparation of this study.
11 Ter. Laws p. 5, sec. 12; 1 Ter. Laws p. 7, sec. 3.
21 Ter. Laws p. 12, sec. 14.
1 Ter. Laws p. 436. G See R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 6713.
See R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 6609. ' See R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 6665.
See R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 6680. 'See R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 6648.
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the case was connected, may be challenged for cause in counties
having a population from 60,000 to 200,000, but not in counties
of greater or lesser population," the inconsistency is flagrant.
Nothing short of a Justinian or Napoleonic codification of laws
relating to the jury in Missouri can serve to bring order out of
this chaos.
In this day when the equality of the sexes is being recognized
in politics and business, when women have had conferred upon
them the same legal rights as men, there is no reason why they
should not bear equally with men the duty of jury service. To
double the number of eligible jurors in this state might aid con-
siderably in the solution of the jury problem.
The law of Missouri has been changed and greatly modified
since 1820. A code of civil procedure has been enacted; only
recently did the legislature provide a Workmen's Compensation
Law; many other laws have supplemented or abrogated the
common law. If that fact-finding mechanism of the common
law, the jury, is to function efficiently today, it can do so only if
those parts of the machine adapted to modern needs are pre-
served and the outworn and useless appendages are replaced by
parts calculated to operate effectively at the present time. The
jury in this state has developed piecemeal; it has grown like
Topsy. Conditions today demand a complete reorganization
along scientific lines. As juries in other states are studied, a
fuller understanding and helpful suggestions will result. Only
through substantial modifications and revisions can confidence
in trial by jury in this state be reestablished.
II. EXEMPTIONS FROM JURY SERVICE
A. INTRODUCTION
The laws of Missouri have provided for the permanent ex-
emption of certain classes of persons from jury service and for
the temporary exemption of others. The tendency of the legis-
lation relating to jury service has resulted in the enactment of
many laws pertaining to exemptions, and conversely to only a
limited number of judicial decisions.
B. EXEMPTIONS UNDER THE GENERAL LAW
1. Permanent Exemptions
Judge Grace of the Supreme Court has said, "The subject of
I See R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 6655.
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the ...exemptions of certain citizens from jury service has
always, in this state, been purely a subject of statutory regula-
tion. . Exemption from jury service is not a personal favor
or disfavor, but for the public comfort and convenience." 10
These statements aptly describe the method by which a person
is made exempt and the basis for allowing the exemptions. That
public policy should determine whether or not certain classes of
persons should be required to serve is in accord with both com-
mon law and common sense. Judge Lamm has expressed anew
the age-old reason for exempting clergymen. "Clergymen are
exempt from jury service this (doubtless) agreeably to the com-
mon-law maxim: No man warring for God should be troubled
with secular business. (Nemo militans Deo im-plicatur seculari-
bus negotiis.) ""
Only one case is on record concerning permanent exemptions
from jury service under the general law. In the case of State
ex rel. Flickinger v. Fisher, decided in 1893, the question arose
as to a dentist's right to claim exemption because he was a doc-
tor. The case was heard before Division Number One of the
Supreme Court, and by a divided court it was held that a dentist
was a practitioner of medicine within the meaning of the stat-
ute.12 Thereafter the case was certified to the Supreme Court
en bane, and by a four-to-three decision, the holding in Division
Number One was reversed and it was held that a dentist was not
a practitioner of medicine within the meaning of the statute.1
As a result of this decision, the legislateire in 1895 amended the
law exempting practitioners of medicine from jury service, so
that dentists were included within the term.14
The history of permanent exemptions from jury duty under
the general law is set forth completely in Chart I. The chart
illustrates the exemption of twenty-four classes of persons from
jury service at the present time. It demonstrates the ever in-
creasing number of exemptions prescribed by statutes from
1808 to date.
"State ex rel. Flickinger v. Fisher (Mo. 1893) 21 S. W. 446, 447.
State v. Railroad (1911) 239 Mo. 196, 319, 143 S. W. 785.
State ex rel. Flickinger v. Fisher (Mo. 1893) 21 S. W. 446.
State ex rel. Flickinger v. Fisher (1893) 119 Mo. 334, 24 S. W. 167.
"'See chart, number 5, and explanatory note (f).
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PERSONS EXEMPT FROI JURY SERVICE UNDER THE GENERAL LAW-YEAR Or ENACTMENT OR REVISION
Classification 1808 1810 1825 1835 1845 1855 1865 1870 1879 1885 1887 1889 1895 1899 1909 1911 1917 1919
1 Clergymen; 2 Attorneys; 3
Constables; 4 Ferry Keepers;
5 Practitioners of (1) Physic
(a), of Medicine (b) .. b....... X X X X X X IN X X X X X X X X X ... X
6 Sheriffs (1) (c) ............. X X X ............................................................
7 Deputy Sheriffs (1) (c) ....... X.. ...... ............ .... .... .... ........ ........ .... .... .... ....
S Clerks of courts (1) (c) ....... .... X X.......... .... ........ .... ........ .... ........ .... .... ....
9 Clerks or other officers of
courts (1) (c) .... .............. ........ X X X X X X X X X X X X X .... X
10 Judges of courts of record (1)... X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ... X
llOverseersofroads(1) ............... X X X X X X X XX X X X X X .... X
12 Persons over 65 years of age (1) ........ X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ... X
13 Coroners(1) (2)(d) ......................... X X X X X X X X X X X. X ... X
14 Grand Jurors during same
term (3) ..... . ................ X XX....X.......X.... X X ...... X
15 Postmasters (1) ................................. X X X X X X X X X X X .. X
16 Millers (1) ....................................... X X X XX X XX X X ... X
17 Professors or teachers in schools
of learning (1) .................................... X X X X X X X X X X .... X
18 Volunteer firemen ready for
active service. 19 Paid firemen
(1) .......................... ............. ............ X X X X X X X X X ... X
20 Officers and guards of Pent-
tentiary (4)................................................... X. ..X S........ X
21 Presidents, cashiers of National
Banks or Banking Cos., Inc,
in M o. (1) (e) ........... I .................... X X .................... ...
22 Superintendents 4 County
Poor Houses (1) ............. .... ............................ .... X X X X X .... X
23 Persons employed in state elee-
mosynary institutions (1) .... ............................................ S X X S ... X
24 Druggists (1) ............... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... X X X X X -... X
25 Pharmacists or assistant phar-
macists in active service (5) ..................................... .... ........ .... .... ......... X
26 Licensed embalmers (1) ...... .... .............. .... ............ ........ .... ........ .... X
27 Licensed dentists (6) (f) .................. .... .... ................ ........ .... ............ X X
28 Members of state military
forces (7).. ....... X
EXPLANATORY NOTE
Classiflcation indicates persons exempt from jury service. X. indicates the year when the exemption was first
alll,,-ed, and iubsequent revisions.
(a) The term was changed to "Practitioners of medicine" in 1865.
(b) In 1895 the term was made to include "all persons lawfully practicing as aurists, oculists, dentists and other
4Peclalits."
(c) 9, in fact, is a continuation of 6, 7 and 8.
qd) Two statutes have always exempted coroners from jury service.
(e) No record appears of the repeal of the statute as to these persons, yet they are not included in any revisions
rom 189 to 1919.
(f) See (b). Dentists were already exempt.
(1) 1808, 1 Ter. Law , p. 199, sec. 2; 1810; 1 Ter. Laws p. 238, sec. 2; R. S. Mo. (1825) p. 468, sec. 7; R. S. Mo.
(1&83*,) p. :34-, see. 9; R. S. Mo. (1845) p. 627, sec. 9; R. S. Mo. (1855) p. 910, sec. 10; G. S. Mo. (1865) p. 597, sec.
4; NlMo. Law: 1870, p. .3:3; R. S. Mo. (1879) see. 2779; Mo. Laws 188.5, p. 185; Mo. Laws 1887, p. 205; R. S. Mo.
(1SSt') sec. 6062; Mo. Laws 1895, p. 201; R. S. Mo. (1899) sec. 3764; R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 7261; Mo. Laws of 1911,
p'. .3 ; R. S. Mo. (1913) see. 6609.
(2) R. S. Mo.. (1845) p. 230, sec. 8; R. S. Mo. (1855) p. 368, sec. 8; G. S. Mo. (1865) p. 391, sec. 1; R. S. Mo.
(1879) ec. 5132; R. S. Mo. (1889) see. 2438; R. S. Mo. (1899) sec. 6629; R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 2921; R. S. Mo.
(1919) .ec. 5916.
0) R. S. Mo. (1845) p. 628, sec. 10; R. S. Mo. (1855) p. 911, sec. 11; G. S. Mo. (1865) p. 598, sec. 12; R. S. Mo.
(1879) sec. 2789; R. S. Mo. (1889) sec. 6075; R. S. M1o. (1899) sec. 3777; R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 7274; R. S. Mo.
(1!4f)) -ec. 6623.
(4) R. S. Mo. (187$) sec. 6529; R. S. Mo. (1889) sec. 7259; R. S. Mo. (1899) sec. 8915; R. S. Mo. (1909) sec.
V532; Mo. Laws 1917, p. 183, sec. 12; R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 12.512.
o) MO. Laws 1909, p, 478, sec. 16; B. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 4727.
(c){ Mo. Laws 1917, p. 267, sec. 5495t; R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 12658.
(7) Mo. Laws 1919, p. 512, sec. 29; R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 7384.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol15/iss3/2
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2. Temporary Exemptions
The following chart sets forth the provisions for the tempo-
rary exemption of persons after service on juries. There are
six divisions arranged in chronological order, each of which
shows the conditions under which jurors have been exempted.
CHART II
TEMPORARY EXEMPTIONS FROM JURY SERVICE UNDER
THE GENERAL LAW
YEAR OF ENACTMENT AND REPEAL
1808-10 1825-73 1826-35
For two years after (1) Jury s ervice to be Six days in any term
serving as juror equalized (2) unless case was not
_ __ [completed (3)
183945 1873-1901 1901 to date
A maximum service of Service at one term of Service as a standing
six juries in one year court a year (5) juror once a year(4) (6)
(1) 1 Ter. Laws, p. 200, see. 6; 1 Ter. Laws, p. 238, see. 4.
(2) R. S. Mo. (1825) p. 468, sec. 8; R. S. Mo. (1835) p. 343, sec. 10;
R. S. Mo. (1845) p. 628, sec. 11; R. S. Mo. (1855) p. 912, sec. 19; G. S.
Mo. (1865) p. 599, sec. 27; Mo. Laws 1873, p. 46.
(3) 2 Ter. Laws, p. 96, sec. 2; R. S. Mo. (1835) p. 384, sec. 33.(4) Mo. Laws 1839, p. 76, sec. 3. Impliedly repealed in 1845 on the
authority of Hogel v. Lindell (1847) 10 Mo. 483.
(5) Mo. Laws 1873, p. 47, sec. 5; Mo. Laws 1874, p. 98, sec. 5; R. S. Mo.(1879) sec. 2785; R. S. Mo. (1889) sec. 6068; R. S. Mo. (1899) sec. 3770.
(6) Mo. Laws 1901, p. 191, see. 3770; R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 7268; R. S.
Mo. (1919) sec. 6616. Intended as a benefit for the party summoned as ajuror. Schneider v. Chew (1911) 157 Mo. A. 354, 138 S. W. 357.
C. EXCUSES
Judge Lewis of the Saint Louis Court of Appeals once said,
"The court may in its discretion, before the jury are empan-
elled, excuse a juror from service, for any cause that may be
deemed sufficient." '15 The same principle was stressed by former
Circuit Judge J. Hugo Grimm who wrote in the Missouri Crime
Survey that "the court has a right to excuse those who have been
summoned and theoretically this is only done where they have
good excuses to offer." 16
"
5O'Brien v. Vulcan Iron Works (1879) 7 Mo. A. 257.
J. H. Grimm, Judicial Administration, Missouni CR E SURWVY (1926)
pp. 178, 179.
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The legislature has provided in counties where the circuit
court is composed of more than one division, and but a single
panel is to be drawn for all the divisions, that one judge desig-
nated by the judges of the court shall hear and determine all
excuses.17 And for cities having populations of more than
100,000,18 as well as for cities having populations of more than
500,000,19 laws have been enacted stipulating that "whenever
any person summoned as a juror under this article shall be ex-
cused by the court from service, the court shall decide whether
he shall be excused for the year ending on the last day of Sep-
tember next ensuing, or only temporarily."
Thus it may be observed from the statements of judges and
the enactments of the legislature, that the power of the trial
court to excuse jurors before the jury is empanelled is con-
clusively established in Missouri.
The significant facts concerning the exercise of this power
are fully set forth by Judge Grimm.
Unfortunately, judges are nominated through the in-
fluence of political organizations which also assist in their
election, and the members of these organizations and some
public officials do not hesitate to use their influence to have
competent and well-qualified citizens who have been sum-
moned to serve as jurors excused from that service. It is
fair to assume that those who seek to be excused are men
of affairs and large interests on the one hand, or working
men who cannot afford to serve. . The former, of course,
are more influential, and acquainted with those having
" Applied to counties containing cities having a population from 150,000
to 400,000; Mo. Laws 1905, p. 175, see. 6; made applicable to counties con-
taining cities having a population from 100,000 to 400,000 inhabitants,
Mo. Laws 1907, p. 323, sec. 1; R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 7323; made applicable
to counties having a population from 200,000 to 400,000, Mo. Laws 1911, p.
309; R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 66§1; enacted and applied to counties having a
population from 60,000 to 200,000, Mo. Laws 1911, p. 306, sec. 6; R. S. Mo.(1919) sec. 6644, Mo. Laws 1929, p. 241, sec. 6644.
'Mo. Laws 1879, p. 34, sec. 19; R. S. Mo. (1889) p. 2166, sec. 19; R. S.
Mo. (1899) sec. 6557; R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 7352; R. S. Mo. (1919) sec.
6690.
'Mo. Laws 1919, p. 428, sec. 19. The law further provides, "It shall be
the duty of the said board of jury supervisors to make and promulgate rules
and regulations for the excusing of jurors from jury service, and it shall
be the duty of each of the judges of any such court to comply with rules
and regulations."
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political influence so that the majority of those who are ex-
cused, as a matter of favor, belong to the former class.
This has a tendency, at least, to lower the standard of the
jury. From time to time campaigns are started to induce
business men not to attempt to evade jury service. Some-
thing may be accomplished in this manner, but it would
seem that a more direct method would be to impress upon
the judges their responsibility in the matter, and their duty
to refuse to excuse capable and representative citizens from
jury duty except where they are .able to present valid
excuses.
There is also the danger of deputy sheriffs making false
returns of "not found" in cases where they have in reality
found and served jurors, and this has occurred usually in
cases where the jurors were to be summoned to serve for
judges known to be strict in requiring good excuses before
relieving the juror from duty.20
In this statement, the judge has pointed out the evils resulting
from the present practices of trial courts in excusing jurors. If
the standard of the jury is to be raised, these evils must be
eradicated.
D. EXEMPTIONS IN PARTICULAR CLASSES OF COUNTIES AND CITIES
Prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1875, particularly
under the Constitution of 1820, and to a lesser extent under the
Constitution of 1865, the legislature was empowered to enact
both general and local laws. The general legislation concerned
measures applicable to the entire state, while the local legisla-
tion often related to particular counties or cities designated by
name. Exemptions from jury service were both local and gen-
eral. Exemptions under the general laws have already been
outlined. The exemptions under local laws were essentially the
same as under the general laws.21 These local laws are of com-
paratively little importance in the history of the development
of exemptions in Missouri. They have been impliedly repealed
by legislation enacted subsequent to the adoption of the Consti-
tution of 1875.
1J. H. Grimm, Judicial Administration, MissouRI CRIME SURVEY (1926)
pp. 178, 179.
" Mo. Laws 1843, p. 245, sec. 3; Mo. Laws 1845, p. 115, sec. 4; Mo. Laws
1847, p. 70, sec. 1; Mo. Laws 1849, p. 489, sec. 20; Mo. Laws 1851, p. 481;
Mo. Laws 1853, p. 106, sec. 1; Mo. Laws. 1872, p. 254; Mo. Laws 1877, p.
280; In re Powell (1878) 5 Mo. A. 220.
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One of the peculiarities of the jury system in this state has
resulted from the policy of the legislature since 1879 to enact
laws of a general nature, and also laws applicable only to certain
classes of counties and cities. Quite frequently, identical, al-
though separately enacted, laws are in force in two different
classes of counties or cities. These laws, consequently appear
twice in the revised statutes. It was not the policy of the legis-
lature to adopt these identical laws simultaneously, but after the
laws had been in force in one class of counties or cities for a
number of years, they were enacted anew for another class of
counties or cities. Another peculiarity of this system is that
while the laws generally have remained unchanged since their
adoption, their applicability has been modified from time to
time. The complexity of the system, and the difficulty of analy-
sis at once become apparent.
1. Counties
Two statutes only have been enacted concerning exemptions of
jurors in particular classes of counties. In 1889, the legislature
provided that "Hereafter in all counties having a population of
fifty thousand inhabitants or over, no petit juror shall be re-
quired to serve on such jury more than two consecutive weeks
during any term of court: Provided, that in no case shall this
section cause the discharge of any juror during the actual
pendency of the trial of any cause."22 The law continues in
effect.2 .3
In 1903, the following exemption provision was enacted for
juries in counties having populations from 100,000 to 175,000:
"The jurors so summoned may be required to serve for the space
of three weeks, at the end of which time they shall be discharged
from further service as jurors; unless they are sitting in the
trial of a cause, in which event they shall be finally discharged
as jurors at the termination of such trial. ' 24 This law. con-
tinued in effect until 1911 when it was repealed.25
R. S. Mo. (1889) sec. 6070.
R. S. Mo. (1899) sec. 3772; R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 7389; R. S. Mo.
(1919) sec. 6638.
"Mo. Laws 1903, p. 211, sec. 12.
"R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 7301; Mo. Laws 1911, p. 305, sec. 1.
Washington University Open Scholarship
EXEMPTIONS FROM JURY SERVICE
2. Cities
A law applicable in cities having populations of more than
100,00026 and in cities having populations over 500,00027 pro-
vides that the courts may determine how long the jurors sum-
moned shall serve. The law has been construed by the courts
to mean that jurors shall serve for such time as the courts di-
rect.28 To these same classes of cities another provision ap-
plieS29 stipulating that no person shall be required to serve as a
juror more than once in any year. The statute is directory30
It confers a personal privilege to claim exemption upon a per-
son summoned for service a second time within a year.2 1
Chart III indicates the exemption of twenty-one classes of
persons under laws applicable only to certain classes of cities.
It should be observed that persons who are exempt in one class
of cities are not necessarily exempt in other classes of cities.
Mo. Laws 1879, p. 34, sec. 20; R. S. Mo. (1889) p. 2166, sec. 20; R. S.
Mo. (1899) sec. 6558; R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 7353; R. S. Mo. (1919) sec.
6691.
"Mo. Laws 1919, p. 428, sec. 20.
SBlyston-Spencer v. Railroad (1910) 152 Mo. A. 118, 132 S. W. 1175;
Turney v. Railroad (1911) 155 Mo. A. 513, 135 S. W. 93.
'Mo. Laws 1885, p. 75, sec. 31; R. S. Mo. (1889) p. 2169, sec. 30; R. S.
Mo. (1899) see. 6567; R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 7361; R. S. Mo. (1919) sec.
6699. See Mo. Laws 1919, p. 431, sec. 27.
State v. Jennings (1889) 98 Mo. 493, 11 S. W. 980.
"Williamson v. Transit Co. (1907) 202 Mo. 345, 100 S. W. 1072; Blyston-
Spencer v. Railroad (1910) 152 Mo. A. 118, 132 S. W. 1175.
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CHART III
PERSONS EXEMPT FROM JURY SERVICE
IN CERTAIN CLASSES OF CITIES*
YEAR OF ENACTMENT OR REVISION
Classification 1879 1889 1895 1897 1899 1903 1909 1919
Militia; Firemen; Persons unable to read,
write, and understand court proceed-
ings; Clergymen; Practitioners of
Medicine; Druggists; Apothecaries;
Attorneys; Ferry-keepers; Millers;
Professors and Teachers; Persons over
65 years; Persons navigating the Mis-
sissippi River and Tributaries; Rail-
road Employees; Employees of the
U. S. and the State of Mo.; Municipal
Employees; Persons of ill fame, etc.(1) (2) ........................... X X ........ X .... X X
Persons serving on jury in preceding
twelve months (1) (2) (3) .......... X X ......... X .... X X
Judges of elections and their clerks (4) (5) .......... ... X .... X X
Members of boards of education (6) ................. X X .... X X
Judges and clerks of election for 2 years
after expiration of term; persons filling
their vacancies for six months after
expiration of term (7) ................................ X X X
EXPLANATORY NOTE
Classification indicates persons exempt from jury service. X indicates
the year when the exemption was first allowed, and subsequent revisions.
(1) Applied to cities having populations in excess of 100,000. Mo. Laws
1879, p. 30, sec. 9; R. S. Mo. (1889) p. 2162, sec. 9; R. S. Mo. (1899) sec.
6547; R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 7342; R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 6680. Cited in
State v. Jackson (1912) 242 Mo. 410, 146 S. W. 116; Anderson v. Pryor(Mo. A. 1919) 209 S. W. 122; State v. Welsor (1893) 117 Mo. 570, 21 S.
W. 443.
(2) Applied in cities having populations in excess of 500,000. Mo. Laws
1919, p. 423, sec. 10.(3) The courts have held that this is a ground for challenge under the
wording of the statute, not merely an exemption. See Williamson v. Tran-
sit Co. (Mo. 1907) 202 Mo. 345, 100 S. W. 1072; Blyston-Spencer v. Rail-
road (1910) 152 Mo. A. 118, 132 S. W. 1175; Asmus v. Railroad (1911)
152 Mo. A. 521, 134 S. W. 92; O'Donnell v. Railroad (1911) 152 Mo. A. 606,
133 S. W. 1166; Kaiser v. Railroad (1911) 155 Mo. A. 428, 135 S. W. 90;
Turney v. Railroad (1911) 155 Mo. A. 513, 135 S. W. 93.(4) Applied to cities having populations in excess of 100,000. The ex-
emptions were secured by two laws (a) Mo. Laws 1895, p. 8, sec. 8; R. S.
Mo. (1899) sec. 7277; R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 6097; R. S. Mo. (1919) sec.
5122; (b) Mo. Laws, Extra Session 1895, p. 43, sec. 98; R. S. Mo. (1899)
see. 7367; R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 6187; R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 5213.
Washington University Open Scholarship
EXEMPTIONS FROM JURY SERVICE
(5) The laws were repealed and a similar provision enacted in 1921.
Mo. Laws 1921, p. 377, sec. 96.(6) Applied to cities having populations in excess of 300,000 until 1909
when the law became applicable only to cities having populations in excess
500,000. Mo. Laws 1897, p. 222, sec. 4; Mo. Laws 1909, p. 846, sec. 1; R. S.
Mo. (1909) sec. 11032; R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 11458.(7) Applied to cities having populations in excess of 300,000 until 1921
when (5) superseded the law. Mo. Laws 1903, p. 191, sec. 42; R. S. Mo.
(1909) sec. 6230; R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 5257.
* Since 1879 the legislature has enacted a number of laws relating to the
procedure of claiming exemptions. See R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 6683; R. S.
Mo. (1919) sec. 6716 and sec. 6717; R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 6685; R. S. Mo.
(1919) sec. 6705.
E. CONCLUSION
The establishment of a scientific system of jury exemptions in
Missouri will require a complete revision of the exemption laws
which are in force at the present time. Seven statutes provide
for permanent jury exemptions under the general law,32 and
four pertain to exemptions in cities,33 of certain classes. Jury
exemptions are determined by public policy. No effort has been
made to evaluate the wisdom of the exemptions which the legis-
lature has allowed. It seems logical and consistent, however,
that persons exempt in one community should be exempt in
others as well. Why railroad employees should be exempt in all
cities having populations of more than 100,000, but not in
smaller cities cannot easily be explained.34 It might be argued
that such persons are needed for jury service in the smaller
communities. There are two replies to this argument. In the
first place, where the population is less, fewer criminal and civil
actions will be heard, whether the ratio varies according to
population or not. In the second place, if the persons exempt in
the large cities are needed in the small cities because of the
scarcity of jurors, then the margin of eligible jurors is so small
as to make the satisfactory working of the jury system a mat-
ter of grave doubt.
In the light of the facts brought out in the consideration of
exemptions from jury service it seems clear that all the pur-
poses which the legislature and the courts have had in mind
could be fully satisfied by two simple statutes of uniform appli-
cation providing that:
e See Chart III."* See Chart 1. "IBid.
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The following persons shall be exempt from jury service
in this state: clergymen, attorneys-at-law, practitioners of
medicine (all persons lawfully practicing as aurists, oc-
ulists, dentists or other specialists), persons over sixty-five
years of age, coroners, grand jurors during their term of
service, judges and clerks of election during their term of
service, millers, professors and teachers in schools of learn-
ing, volunteer firemen, paid firemen, druggists, pharmacists
.and assistant pharmacists in active service, licensed em-
balmers, persons actually and regularly employed in the
navigation of the Mississippi River or its tributaries, rail-
road employees, employees of the United States, employees
of the State of Missouri, and employees of counties and
municipalities of the State of Missouri.
. A temporary exemption-for one year shall be granted to
any persons who has rendered jury service in a case (or in
several successive cases not occupying over a week of time,
provided that no person shall be discharged before the
termination of a case) during any term of court.
Without doubt the many classes of persons exempt from jury
service tend to reduce the standard of the jury, but under con-
ditions existing today, it is almost imperative that these exemp-
tions be allowed. A mor6 serious problem arises, however, in
connection with the large number who are excused by the judges
before the impanelling of the juries. As Judge Grimm has
pointed out,8 ' such persons are usually more intelligent and more
capable than many who are required to serve. A single exemp-
tion here and an occasional excuse there are not material in af-
fecting the standard of the mass of jurors, but it is the sum
total of persons exempt and excused whose absence has such a
profound effect on the quality of juries. It has been observed
that there is a sound basis, public policy, for exempting jurors;
except in rare instances, there probably is no such cause for ex-
cusing jurors. In order to improve the standard of the average
juror, it is imperative that the number of persons excused from
jury duty be materially reduced.
Willis B. Perkins has remarked that adequate provision
should be made for the comfort and accommodation of the jurors
while engaged in the performance of their duty, and that when
they have good quarters in which to sleep, when they are fur-
nished better food, and rest rooms, jurors will not be so inclined
See Insert pp. 234, 235, supra.
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to invent or seek excuses to avoid service.3 6 Some persons have
suggested that in these particulars the situation in Missouri is
not the best. However, no statement to this effect can be made
without an extensive study of juries throughout the state.
Judge Grimm's suggestions that citizens should be impressed
with their duty to serve on juries, and that judges should be im-
pressed with their responsibilities in jury trials are obviously
basic, but little can be achieved in those directions until the com-
munity is aroused to a fuller respect for jury service. As long
as jury service is in disrepute, as long as capable citizens en-
deavor to avoid their duty, only rarely will competent juries sit
in court. If the people could realize the very important func-
tions which the courts perform in society today, they would
more willingly serve on juries, for they would realize how
closely such service is bound up with their own welfare. Pos-
sibly, a series of statutes, calculated to penalize persons and
judges who connive to excuse without cause qualified jurors
would reduce the number of persons seeking to avoid jury duty.
III. CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE
A. INTRODUCTION
The right to a fair and impartial trial by jury at common law
was secured, in part, through the use of the privilege of chal-
lenging for cause. Such a challenge was made either to the
array or to the polls, depending upon whether the competence
of the entire panel or individual jurors was summoned into
question. The court's failure to discharge the panel or the indi-
vidual juror, when properly challenged, constituted error. As
an essential feature of jury trial, challenges for cause are pre-
served in Missouri under the common law and by statute. This
paper will deal with the historical development of challenges for
cause in this state.
B. PROCEDURE
1. Time of Stating Exceptions
In order that appellate courts may review the action of a
lower court in accepting or rejecting a juror upon the trial of a
N Perkins, Some Needed Reforms in the Mfethods of Selecting Juriesi
(1915) 13 MICH. L. Rzv. 391, 399.
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cause, it is essential that the juror be challenged at the proper
time. The matter has been regulated by statute. In 1825, the
legislature provided that "no exception against any such juror
on" account of his citizenship, non-residence, estate, or age, or
other legal disability shall be allowed after he is sworn or af-
firmed."P7 The law was amended in 1835, but is substantially
the same today as it was at that time.-8
The reason for the rule is set forth by Judge Napton in an
early case in which the competence of a juror was summoned into
question for the first time in a motion for a new trial. "If the
juror was incompetent, and that incompetency was known to
the defendant before the trial, he cannot now seek to reverse
the judgment on that ground. . . If . . . either party may re-
ceive incompetent jurors, and after taking the chances of the
opinion of the juror being in his favor, make it a ground for
reversing the verdict, when it is discovered to be otherwise,
there could be no end to litigation." 39
The Missouri courts have held generally that the competency
of a juror will not be reviewed for the first time upon a motion
for a new trial.4 0 The best statement of the rule is found in the
recent case of State v. Ferris, in which it was held that an ob-
jection based on the claim that one of the jurors had prejudged
the case was made too late, in the absence of a showing of
definite facts concerning the exact time when counsel received
knowledge of the juror's incompetence, since in case it was
known or was discoverable by the exercise of ordinary diligence,
it should have been brought to the attention of the trial court
at the proper time.4 1 If, however, counsel has made reasonable
R. S. Mo. (1825) p. 467, sec. 6.
S"No exception against any juror, on account of his citizenship, non-
residence, state or age, or other legal disability shall be allowed after the
jury.are sworn." R. S. Mo. (1835) p. 343, sec. 8; R. S. Mo. (1845) p. 627,
sec. 8; R. S. Mo. (1855) p. 910, sec. 9; G. S. Mo. (1865) p. 597, sec. 3; R. S.
Mo. (1879) sec. 2778; R. S. Mo. (1889) sec. 6061; R. S. Mo. (1899) sec.
3763; R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 7260; R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 6608.
' Lisle v. State (1840) 6 Mo. 426, 430, 432.
' State v. Jackson (1888) 96 Mo. 200, 9 S. W. 642; Frank Hlart Realty
Co. v. Ryan (1921) 288 Mo. 188, 232 S. W. 126; Vierling v. Stifel Brewing
Co. (1884) 15 Mo. A. 125; Boleter v. Roy (1890) 40 Mo. A. 234; Pitt v.
Bishop (1893) 53 Mo. A. 600.
'State v. Ferris (Mo. 1926) 16 S. W. (2d) 96; accord, Pitt v. Bishop
(1893) 53 Mo. A. 600.
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effort to ascertain the juror's competency in due course of trial,
and thereafter the juror is found to have prejudged the case, the
objection will be considered in a motion for new trial. Such was
the intent of the legislature.42
It has been held that the statute concerning the time when
challenges may be made takes precedence over other statutes
providing that persons possessing certain enumerated legal disa-
bilities shall not serve as jurors.43 Objections to the competency
of jurors, after the jury are sworn, are made too late.4
Stated somewhat differently, the law is that ordinarily the
competency of a juror will not be reviewed on appeal unless he
was challenged in accordance with the statute.45
In criminal cases, the legislature early adopted a supple-
mentary statute, designed to provide a method for securing at
the discretion of the judge the discharge of an incompetent juror
after the jury was sworn. The appellate courts seem never to
have taken occasion to refer to this statute. First enacted in
1835, the law is essentially the same today as it was at the time
of its original passage. "All challenges for cause may be tried
by the court, on the oath of the person challenged, or by triers46
on other evidence, and such challenges shall be made before the
juror is sworn; but if the cause of challenge be discovered after
a juror is sworn, and before any part of the evidence is de-
4State v. Ross (1859) 29 Mo. 32; accord, State v. Barr (Mo. A. 1929) 20
S. W. (2d) 599. See State v. Baker (Mo. 1930) 24 S. W. (2d) 1039.
R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 6608.
"State v. France (1882) 76 Mo. 681; State v. Waller (1885) 88 Mo. 402;
State v. Myers (1906) 198 Mo. 225, 94 S. W. 242; State v. Sartino (1908)
216 Mo. 408, 115 S. W. 1015; State v. Wilson (1910) 230 Mo. 647, 132 S. W.
238; State v. Davis (1911) 237 Mo. 237, 140 S. W. 902; State v. Parsons
(Mo. 1926) 285 S. W. 412; State v. Murray (1926) 316 Mo. 31, 292 S. W.
434; State v. Hicks (Mo. 1928) 3 S. W. (2d) 230; Orr v. Bradley (1907)
126 Mo. A. 146, 103 S. W. 1149; Knight v. Kansas City (1909) 138 Mo. A.
153, 119 S. W. 990; Pemiscott Land & Cooperage Co. v. Davis (1910) 147
Mo. A. 194, 126 S. W. 218; Voghts v. Kansas City Rys. Co. (Mo. A. 1920)
228 S. W. 526; Koontz v. Wabash Ry. Co. (Mo. A. 1923) 253 S. W. 413;
State v. Barr (Mo. A. 1929) 20 S. W. (2d) 599.
" City of Tarkio v. Cook (1893) 120 Mo. 1, 25 S. W. 202; State v. Shoe-
maker (Mo. 1916) 183 S. W. 322; State v. Dooms (1919) 280 Mo. 84, 217
S. W. 43; State v. Ivy (Mo. 1917) 192 S. W. 737; State v. Garrett (1920)
285 Mo. 279, 226 S. W. 4; Frank Hart Realty Co. v. Ryan (1921) 288 Mo.
188, 232 S. W. 126; Loeffler v. Keokuk (1879) 7 Mo. A. 185.
"The words, "by triers," have been omitted from the statute since 1879.
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livered, he may be discharged, or not, in the discretion of the
court." 4
Of vital importance in connection with procedure in criminal
cases, relating both to challenges for cause and exemptions from
jury service is a statute which was enacted in 1835 and which
continues in effect today. "The proceedings prescribed by law
in civil cases, in respect to the impaneling of jurors, the keep-
ing, them together, and the manner of rendering their verdict
shall be had upon trials on indictments and prosecutions for
criminal offenses, except in cases otherwise provided by stat-
ute."48
2. Challenges to the Array and to the Polls
A challenge to the array is a challenge to the entire panel of
jurors. Such a challenge, at common law and under Missouri
practice, must precede the challenge to the polls, which is a
challenge to individual jurors.49 After an exception is taken to
a single juror, a challenge to the entire panel is invalid unless
such a challenge has already been made.50 Moreover, the com-
mon law practice, unabrogated in this state, is that a challenge
to the array must be in writing.61 This does not apply to a chal-
lenge to the pollsA2
"'R. S. Mo. (1835) p. 490, sec. 12; R. S. Mo. (1845) p. 880, sec. 13; R. S.
Mo. (1855) p. 1191, sec. 15; G. S. Mo. (1865) p. 849, sec. 14; R. S. Mo.
(1879) sec. 1898; R. S. Mo. (1889) sec. 4198; R. S. Mo. (1899) sec. 2617;
R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 5221; R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 4015.
' R. S. Mo. (1835) p. 490, sec. 14; R. S. Mo. (1845) p. 880, sec. 15; R. S.
Mo. (1855) p. 1191, sec. 17; G. S. Mo. (1865) p. 850, sec. 16; R. S. Mo.
(1879) sec. 1906; R. S. Mo. (1889) sec. 4306; R. S. Mo. (1899) sec. 2625;
R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 5229; R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 4023; cited in State v.
Lewis (Mo. 1929) 20 S. W. (2d) 529.
'Thompson, TRIuLs (2d ed.) sec. 91; State v. Weeden (1895) 133 Mo.
70, 34 S. W. 473; State v. Powers (1896) 136 Mo. 194, 37 S. W. 936.
*Thompson, TRILS (2d ed.) sec. 91; State v. Clark (1894) 121 Mo. 500,
26 S. W. 562; State v. Weeden (1895) 133 Mo. 70, 34 S. W. 473; State v.
Taylor (1896) 134 Mo. 109, 35 S. W. 92.
" Samuels v. State (1831) 3 Mo. 68; State v. Clark (1894) 121 Mo. 500,
26 S. W. 562; State v. Taylor (1896) 134 Mo. 109, 35 S. W. 92; State v.
Brennan (1901) 164 Mo. 487, 65 S. W. 325; State v. Hottman (1906) 196
Mo. 110, 94 S. W. 237; State v. Church (1906) 199 Mo. 605, 98 S. W. 16;
State v. Ivy (Mo. 1917) 192 S. W. 737; State v. Garrett (1920) 285 Mo.
279, 226 S. W. 4; State v. Ray (Mo. 1920) 225 S. W. 969.
"State v. Clark (1894) 121 Mo. 500, 26 S. W. 562.
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The rule consistently followed 51 that challenges for cause must
be specifically recited, is expounded by Judge Sherwood in a
leading case. "In making... challenges for cause, this formula
was observed at the close of the examination of each venire-
man: 'Counsel for defendant objected to this juror as disquali-
fied and not qualified to sit as a competent juror in this cause,
and challenged said juror for cause. Objection and challenge
overruled, to which ruling defendants excepted.' Now nothing
is better settled than that challenges for cause must be specif-
ically stated. . . Fairness to the court and to adverse counsel
alike demand the grounds of the challenge for cause be par-
ticularly set forth."5
However, there is a gloss on the general rule which was stated
by Judge Sherwood. Judge Reynolds of the Saint Louis Court
of Appeals in a well written opinion said, "There is no room for
the contention over the correctness of this (that challenges must
be specifically stated) as a general rule, but its application, as in
all rules, must depend on the facts in any particular case. The
reason for the definiteness in objection as well as in challenge is
that the trial court as well as this court may know exactly what
is required to be ruled upon. . . In the case at bar, it is obvious
that the challenge was grounded upon prejudice, confessed by
the juror to have been entertained by him. No other disqualifi-
cation is suggested and the challenge could have been aimed at
no other ground."
The decision in the Court of Appeals' case appears to be sound.
When the court and counsel are familiar with the causes for the
objection to a juror, formalities of procedure should not inter-
U State v. Albright (1898) 144 Mo. 638, 46 S. W. 620; State v. Soper
(1898) 148 Mo. 217, 49 S. W. 1007; State v. McGinnis (1900) 158 Mo. 105,
59 S. W. 83; State v. Evans (1900) 161 Mo. 95, 61 S. W. 590; State v. Miles
(1906) 199 Mo. 530, 98 S. W. 25; State v. Forsha (1905) 190 Mo. 296, 88
S. W. 746; State v. McCarver (1905) 194 Mo. 717, 92 S. W. 684; State v.
Myers (1906) 198 Mo. 225, 94 S. W. 242; State v. Bobbitt (1908) 215 Mo.
10, 114 S. W. 511; State v. Wooley (1908) 215 Mo. 620, 115 S. W. 417;
State v. Tucker (1910) 232 Mo. 1, 133 S. W. 27; State v. Fields (1911) 234
Mo. 615, 138 S. W. 518; State v. Mace (1914) 262 Mo. 143, 170 S. W.
1105; State v. Ray (Mo. 1920) 225 S. W. 969; State v. Poor (1921) 286
Mo. 644, 228 S. W. 810; State v. Craft (1923) 299 Mo. 332, 253 S. W. 224.
State v. Taylor (1896) 134 Mo. 109, 142, 143, 35 S. W. 92.
't Carroll v. United Rys. Co. (1911) 157 Mo. A. 247, 262, 137 S. W. 303.
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fere with fundamental principles of justice. On the other hand,
as the courts have pointed out, it is a wise policy to enforce the
rule that challenges should be specifically stated in order that the
parties may apprehend the reason for the objection.
3. Discretion of Trial Court in Discharging Jurors;
Appellate Review
The rule generally approved is that the trial court possesses a
large discretion in the selection and impaneling of the jury 0
In the leading case of State ex rel. Goldsoll v. Bank, decided
in 1883, which, however, states a broader rule than that later
followed, the court held, "The decision of the court accepting or
rejecting a juror, is the decision of a question of fact under the
law, and it should be regarded in appellate courts like the de-
cision of any other question of fact which it becomes the duty
of the court to decide. If, when it comes up for review, it is sup-
ported by evidence, it ought not to be disturbed, although the
seeming weight of evidence may be against it. The trial court
is better able to pass on such a question than an appellate
court." 57
In a case decided in 1892 the court said, "But while the dis-
qualification of a juror under the statute58 is a pure question of
law and is to be reviewed as such, the disqualification of a juror
for other causes is a question of fact, and the finding of the trial
court thereon is conclusive on appeal, unless it is clearly and
manifestly against the weight of the evidence."'O While the
courts have often held that the decision of a trial court in the
selection of jurors will not be reversed unless it is clearly and
Stoner v. State (1836) 4 Mo. 368; State v. Brooks (1887) 92 Mo. 542,
5 S. W. 257; State v. Brown (1905) 188 Mo. 451, 87 S. W. 519; Joyce v.
Railroad (1909) 219 Mo. 344, 118 S. W. 21; State v. Taylor (1896) 134
Mo. 109, 35 S. W. 92; Quirk v. Railroad (1919) 200 Mo. A. 585, 210 S. W.
103; Bright v. Sammons (Mo. A. 1919) 214 S. W. 425; Robbins v. Olson-
Schmidt Const. Co. (Mo. A. 1919) 215 S. W. 779; State v. Poor (1921) 286
Mo. 644, 228 S. W. 810; Dorton v. Railroad (1920) 204 Mo. A. 262, 224
S. W. 30; Kelley v. Sinn (Mo. A. 1925) 277 S. W. 861; State v. Ingram
(1926) 316 Mo. 268, 289 S. W. 637; State v. Tally (Mo. 1929) 22 S. W.
(2d) 787.
" (1883) 80 Mo. 626, 632.
'Now R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 6632; See p. 255, infra.
Coppersmith v. Railroad (1892) 51 Mo. A. 357, 365.
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manifestly against the weight of the evidence,o the distinction
drawn by the court in this case between statutory and other
grounds of exclusion is difficult to support.
A reasonable rule appears in the case of Glascow v. Railroad,
decided in 1905. "The court was right in overruling the chal-
lenge because the facts stated did not disqualify the juror. But
the authority of the court in such case is not limited to a de-
cision of the strict legal question of the qualifications of a juror;
it has a discretion to be exercised in the administration of jus-
tice in which it may excuse a juror who although not legally dis-
qualified yet whose sitting is reasonably liable to fill either party
with an apprehension of unfairness. A court in the exercise of
that discretion will not attempt to allay an unreasonable sus-
picion, but when it can remove a cause of reasonable apprehen-
sion on the one side without injuring in any degree the rights of
the other or giving the other cause for a similar reasonable ap-
prehension, it is the right and duty of the court to do so, and
when in that respect the court exercises a sound judicial dis-
cretion its ruling will not be disturbed. The trial court stands
closer to the source of justice than any other tribunal, because
much of the administration of justice depends on the wise exer-
cise of a discretion that the law has reposed in him alone. We
are satisfied that the court exercised its discretion wisely in ex-
cusing this juror."'61
In the leading case of Theobald ,v. Transit Co., also decided in
1905, the Supreme Court in handing down a logical and well
written opinion, attacking squarely and directly the holding in
the Bank case, said, "The question of the qualification of a juror
is a question to be decided by the court and not one to be de-
cided by the juror himself. It is the prerogative and duty of
"McCarthy v. Railroad (1887) 92 Mo. 536, 4 S. W. 516; Ruschenberg v.
Railroad (1901) 161 Mo. 70, 61 S. W. 626; McManama v. Railroad (1913)
175 Mo. A. 43, 158 S. W. 442; Shore v. Dunham (Mo. A. 1915) 178 S. W.
900; Richardson v. Railroad (1921) 288 Mo. 258, 231 S. W. 938; Johnson v.
Electric Light Co. (Mo. A. 1921) 232 S. W. 1095; Ternetz v. Lime & Ce-
ment Co. (Mo. 1923) 252 S. W. 65; Parlon v. Wells (Mo. 1929) 17 S. W.
(2d) 528; State v. Taylor (1896) 134 Mo. 109, 35 S. W. 92; State v. Baker
(Mo. 1926) 285 S. W. 416; State v. Walton (1881) 74 Mo. 271; State v.
Brooks (1887) 92 Mo. 542, 5 S. W. 257; State v. Bauerle (1898) 145 Mo.
1, 46 S. W. 609; State v. Poor (1921) 286 Mo. 644, 228 S. W. 810.
'" Glascow v. Railroad (1905) 191 Mo. 347, 356, 89 S. W. 915.
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the trial court to exercise a wise, judicial discretion in this re-
gard, and the conclusion of the court should rest upon the facts
stated by the juror with reference to his state of mind, and
should not be allowed to depend upon the conclusions of the
juror as to whether or not he could or would divest himself of
a prejudice he admitted existed in his mind. . . It is proper to ex-
amine a juror as to the nature, character, and cause of his
prejudice or bias, but it is not proper to permit the juror, who
admits the existence in his mind of such prejudice or bias, to
determine whether or not he can or cannot, under his oath, ren-
der an impartial verdict. Such a course permits the juror to be
the judge of his qualifications, instead of requiring the court to
pass upon them as questions of fact."
"It is altogether a mistaken idea that the ruling of the trial
court on such questions is conclusive and not subject to review.
In some cases it has been loosely said that the ruling of the court
on such questions is like the ruling of the trial court in law cases,
and that where there is any evidence to support the ruling an
appellate court will not review the same. . . It is the discretion
exercised by the trial judge which is the subject of review. In
approaching the decision of that question an appellate court is
guided by the same rule that obtains with reference to the re-
view of discretionary judicial acts of inferior tribunals. Great
deference is to be paid to the finding of a trial judge, but that
finding is not conclusive, and where the facts are, as here practi-
cally undisputed, such ruling is subject to review on appeal.
Otherwise the whole power and authority as to the selection of
jurors would be vested in the trial court, and it is against the
policy of our law to permit any ruling in a nisi prius court to be
beyond review and correction by an appellate court. Accorded
such power, all else would be a foregone conclusion, and a liti-
gant would be entirely at the mercy of the trial judge, and the
usefulness and propriety of appellate courts, would, to a large
extent be diminished."6 2
The apparent purpose of the Theobald opinion was to lay
down a clear rule of law which the courts in this state could
follow thereafter. The Supreme Court in a case decided in 1913
reached its conclusion by citing the Bank case as authority; at
(1905) 191 Mo. 395, 417, 418, 90 S. W. 354.
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the same time it referred approvingly to the Theobald case, but
seems not to have noticed that the latter case directly overruled
the holding in the former.6 3 In a case decided in 1920, reference
was made to the Theobald case and part of the decision was
quoted with approval64
In the light of the conflicting views expressed by the courts
of appeals and the Supreme Court from time to time, it would
seem advisable to analyze the question anew and reach a final
decision which would end all doubts and uncertainties which
now confront practicing attorneys in the trial of a cause. As a
starting point for a judicious re-analysis no case presents a bet-
ter view and a more reasonable approach than Theobald v. Tran-
sit Co.
Trial courts would profit by the advice offered by Judge Faris
of the Supreme Court. "In passing we take the opportunity to
say that the small trouble of telling an incompetent juror to
stand aside and of calling . . a competent one to take his
place, ought so lightly to weigh against the hazard of the case
of refusing to take this step, and against the ofttimes outrageous
unfairness to a defendant on trial, mayhap for his life, that
ordinarily neither the court nisi nor the State's counsel, out of
the abundance of caution and impartiality, should ever take so
momentous a chance. But for most unaccountable reasons, we
have long observed that in a great majority of cases the moment
the defense undertakes to disqualify a juror the State (aided
more often than necessary by the trial court) rushes to the
juror's relief as if the particular juror were Atlas and the world
rested on him. It is no reflection on the trial court or on the
State's attorney to have counsel for defendant disqualify a pro-
posed juror; it is more often a reflection on both judge and
counsel when they refuse to permit it. With the world abso-
lutely filled with unprejudiced jurors, error in this behalf is
usually gratuitous and unnecessary, a few notorious causes
celebres excepted.'5
4. Retrials Resulting From Errors in Rejecting Challenges
Courts of this state all agree that a man is entitled to an un-
" McManama v. Railroad (1913) 175 Mo. A. 43, 158 S. W. 442.
"Vessels v. Light & Power Co. (Mo. 1920) 219 S. W. 80.
" State v. Mace (1914) 262 Mo. 143, 154, 170 S. W. 1105.
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prejudiced jury of his peers. The problem presenting itself is
whether, if a man has received such a trial but only through
the use of one or more of his peremptory challenges, he is or is
not entitled to a new trial, provided that the juror peremptorily
challenged is admittedly incompetent. On this question the ap-
pellate courts have handed down contradictory opinions.
In a case in 1876 before the Saint Louis Court of Appeals,
where a challenge for cause had been overruled by the trial court
and, thereafter, the juror was challenged peremptorily, the court
held that it manifestly appeared that defendant was in no way
prejudiced by the action of the trial court in accepting this
juror, except on the erroneous theory that peremptory challenge
means the right to select, and not the mere right to exclude.10
And in a case before the Supreme Court in 1929, it was held
that the refusal of the trial court to sustain plaintiff's challenge
of a venireman for cause, if error, was harmless, since the
veniieman was later challenged peremptorily. The court pointed
out that the verdict in this case was unanimous, while under the
Constitution, a verdict of three -fourths of the jurors would have
sufficed.7
In a case in 1905, the Supreme Court expressed a totally dif-
ferent opinion. "Under our statute each party is absolutely en-
titled to three peremptory challenges. The statute also gives
parties litigant the right to challenge a juror for cause. If er-
ror appears in the ruling of the court on a challenge for cause
that question should be decided wholly independent of any con-
sideration of whether the party litigant had or had not ex-
hausted his peremptory challenges. In other words, the statute
provides for two classes of challenges, one for cause and the
other peremptorily without assigning any cause. And in the
determination of the question of the propriety of the ruling up-
on a challenge for cause, it is improper to mix with it a con-
sideration of the question as to whether or not the complaining
party had exhausted his peremptory challenges. ' 68
The Saint Louis Court of Appeals in 1911 reversed the posi-
tion it had taken in 1876. The court held, "The result of over-
ruling the challenge for cause was that counsel for defendant
Eckert v. Transfer Co. (1876) 2 Mo. A. 36, 43.
Parlon v. Wells (Mo. 1929) 17 S. W. (2d) 528.
Theobald v. Transit Co. (1905) 191 Mo. 395, 424, 90 S. W. 354.
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was compelled to use one of his three peremptory challenges to
which he was entitled by law, to get rid of this disqualified juror,
whom he had duly challenged. Counsel for respondent urges
that the verdict of the jury was unanimous and that defendant
had accepted the jury and was not hurt. That argument will
not do as it assumes the whole point in issue."
"The right to a fair and unprejudiced jury is at the very
foundation of the right of trial by jury. If there are any doubts
as to the qualifications of a venireman, they should be solved
against the one challenged. A party submitting his case to the
arbitrament of a jury is entitled to a jury, every member of
which is a qualified juror-above all doubt or question. The
law requires a panel of eighteen qualified men-in a civil case-
from which the jury is to be struck. Even when the eighteen
qualified men are selected, the law gives each party to the action
the right to strike off three names without requiring cause for
the act. Each party is entitled to exercise this peremptory
challenge of three men out of a panel of competent, qualified
jurors."' 9 The judgment was reversed.
The theory referred to as erroneous in the case of 1876 that
peremptory challenge means the right to select, and not the mere
right to exclude, has been somewhat more broadly stated. "No
party has a right to have a particular juror or set of jurors.
The privilege of challenge is a right to reject, and not a right to
select." 70 Now the true argument which the court overlooked in
1876 is the argument forcibly presented in 1911, namely, that
the law requires a panel of eighteen qualified men-in a civil
case-from which the jury is to be struck. On any other theory,
the statute providing for peremptory challenges is reduced to a
nullity. Such a line of reasoning, followed to its logical con-
clusion, would provide in a civil case that even though three
jurors should have been excused when challenged for cause,
since those jurors were challenged peremptorily, the challeng-
ing party would have no grounds of complaint. Pursuing this
line of reasoning even a further step, it may be assumed that
six incompetent jurors are permitted to remain on the panel
after being duly challenged for cause and thereafter three are
Carroll v. United Rys. Co. (1911) 157 Mo. A. 247, 264, 137 S. W. 303.
"O'Brien v. Vulcan Iron-Works (1879) 7 Mo. A. 257; See State ex rel.
Railroad v. Slover (1896) 134 Mo. 607, 36 S. W. 50.
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challenged peremptorily. It might be argued that since a ver-
dict by nine of a jury of twelve is valid in a civil case, the
presence of the three incompetent jurors does not affect the
verdict. Truly, as the court pointed out in 1911, such reasoning
assumes the whole point. Moreover, while the selection-rejec-
tion argument is generally accepted and is valid when properly
used, it is not sound when applied to peremptory challenges, for
the purpose of such challenges is to permit each party to re-
ject a certain number of jurors on the panel who are qualified;
the peremptory challenge has never been considered as a sec-
ondary form of challenge for cause.
The failure to challenge a juror peremptorily after a chal-
lenge for cause has been overruled constitutes a waiver of the
challenge for cause on appeal. 71 This rule of law, doubtless, is
responsible for the policy of counsel in challenging peremptorily
after the challenge for cause has been overruled. Decisions by
some courts that the party has no just ground for complaint
after the juror objected to has been removed produce anomalous
situations. The procedure must be followed for the appeal to be
perfected, and thereafter the complaining party is informed
that he has no ground for objection because the juror is not on
the panel. To use a homely illustration, the courts treat the
problem in the same way as does the mother who gives her child
candy, and after the sweet has been consumed, punishes the in-
fant for eating it. In order to avoid the evil results naturally
ensuing from the line of decisions to which reference has just
been made, the courts would have to declare that an incompetent
juror retained on the panel after challenge for cause, and duly
challenged peremptorily, should necessitate a reversal of the
trial court under the present theory of jury trial.
C. QUALIFICATIONS OF JURORS UNDER THE GENERAL LAW
1. General Provisions
In 1825 the legislature provided that "every petit juror shall
be a free white male citizen of this state, and resident within
"Thompson, TRiALS (2d ed.) sec. 120; Carroll v. United Rys. Co: (1911)
157 Mo. A. 247, 137 S. W. 303; Pratt Grain Co. v. Schreiber (1923) 213
Mo. A. 268, 249 S. W. 449; Williamson v. Transit Co. (1907) 102 Mo. 345,
100 S. W. 1072.
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the county, above the age of twenty-one years.''72 The law re-
mained substantively the same until 186573 when it was modi-
fied to read as follows: "Every juror, grand and petit, shall be
a white male citizen of the state, resident in the county, sober
and intelligent, of good reputation, over twenty-one years of
age, and otherwise qualified. 17 4 In 1879, the word "white" was
omitted from the statute, thus making negroes and other colored
peoples eligible for service on the same footing as whites. The
law, as amended in 1879, continues in effect today.75
The statute has been invoked but seldom, and then primarily
on the ground that jurors on the panel were not citizens of the
state and residents of the county where the trial was being held.
The Supreme Court has ruled that residence in the state and
county for a period of time varying from thirty days to five
months is sufficient to qualify the juror to serve under the
statute, provided that the juror has shown his intention of re-
maining permanently in the county.6 A person duly qualified
to vote is a citizen within the meaning of the statute.77 How-
ever, "while the right to exercise the elective franchise is the
highest evidence of citizenship, a man may be a citizen of the
county in which he permanently resides without possessing the
necessary qualifications of a voter," and such a person is a com-
petent juror.78
2. Qualifications in Civil Cases
a. Eligibility of Residents of City or County When City or
County Is a Party
"At common law, inhabitants and taxpaying citizens of a
municipality were held to be incompetent to sit as jurors in a
cause wherein the municipality was a party because of their in-
" R. S. Mo. (1825) p. 467, sec. 6.
,3 R. S. Mo. (1835) p. 343, sec. 6; R. S. Mo. (1845) p. 627, sec. 6; R. S.
Mo. (1855) p. 910, sec. 3.
"G. S. Mo. (1865) p. 597, sec. 2.
" R. S. Mo. (1879) sec. 2777; R. S. Mo. (1889) sec. 6060; R. S. Mo.
(1899) sec. 3762; R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 7259; R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 6607.
" State v. France (1882) 76 Mo. 681; State v. Fairlamb (1893) 121 Mo.
137, 25 S. W. 895.
"State v. Pagels (1887) 92 Mo. 300, 4 S. W. 931; State v. Burns (1898)
148 Mo. 167, 49 S. W. 1005.
" State v. Fairlamb (1893) 121 Mo. 137, 150, 25 S. W. 895.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol15/iss3/2
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
terest, though remote, by being compelled to contribute their
mite to the payment of any judgment obtained against the
municipality."' 9 The same rule has been held to apply where a
county is a party to an action. 0
In 1825, the legislature abandoned the common law rule con-
cerning counties. The statute then enacted provided that, "in
all actions brought by or against any county, the inhabitants of
the county so suing, or being sued, may be jurors, ... if other-
wise competent and qualified. 8, The law remained virtually un-
changed until 1889, when it was amended so as to include cities
in the same category with counties.82 With this change the law
is still in force.88
The statute has been invoked on a number of occasions. In a
case decided in 1848, Judge Scott said, "The objection to the
jurors was a valid one. It is a clear principle that jurors must
be omni exceptione mcajores, free from every objection and
wholly disinterested... Although the legislature has made the
inhabitants of a county competent jurors in suits in which the
county is a party, it has not relaxed the law as to corporations.
A regard to convenience dictated this change in the law. The
books are full that challenges are allowed when the issue con-
cerns a corporation or city and they are to make the panel."8
All early cases are in accord with this ruling8
However, since the amendment of 1889, the courts have held
jurors who are residents of a city which is a party to an action
competent. As the court said in a recent case, "While we be-
lieve that trial courts should use great caution in the selection
City of Cape Girardeau v. Hunze (1926) 314 Mo. 438, 456, 284 S. W.
471.
Eberle v. Board of President and Directors of St. Louis Pub. Schools
(1848) 11 Mo. 247.
R. S. Mo. (1825) p. 244, see. 5.
1R. S. Mo. (1835) p. 143, sec. 9; R. S. Mo. (1845) p. 290, see. 9; R. S.
Mo. (1855) p. 503, sec. 91 G. S. Mo. (1865) p. 225, see. 7; R. S. Mo. (1879)
sec. 2801; R. S. Mo. (1889) sec. 6088.
1R. S. Mo. (1899) sec. 3790; R. S. Mo. (1909) see. 7288; R. S. Mo. (1919)
sec. 6637.
'Eberle v. Board of President and Directors of St. Louis Pub. Schools
(1848) 11 Mo. 247, 261.
'Fine v. St. Louis Pub. Schools (1860) 30 Mo. 166; Rose v. City of St.
Charles (1872) 49 Mo. 509; Fulweiler v. City of St. Louis (1876) 61 Mo.
479; O'Brien v. Vulcan-Iron-Works (1879) 7 Mo. A. 257.
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of impartial jurors in the trial of causes, and that, upon the
slightest showing of partiality or bias, a juror should be excused
by the trial court, we cannot say in the instant case, in view of
the existing statute, that the trial court committed reversible
error in refusing to excuse as jurors property owners in the
sewer district." 8
The action of the legislature in reversing the common law rule
has greatly simplified the task of selecting jurors in cases where
counties and municipalities are parties to actions. Resident
jurors are probably as well qualified as those brought from out-
side the county or city, for the loss to each juror in the event of
a judgment against the county or municipality is so infini-
tesimally small as to be of no practical importance.
b. Disqualification of Witnesses, Persons Who Possess Opinions,
and Relatives of Parties to Causes
A single statutory provision pertaining to the competency of
persons for jury service in civil cases, if such persons are wit-
nesses, have expressed opinions, or are related to parties to the
action, is found in the body of the law relating to juries. His-
torically, the statute first appeared in 1816.87
The legislature in 1835 provided that "No witness, or person
summoned as a witness, in any civil cause, and no person who
has formed or expressed an opinion concerning the matter in
controversy, in any such cause, which may influence the judg-
ment 8 of such person, shall be sworn as a juror in the same
cause.", '9 The significant feature of the statute of 1835 is that
it enables individuals to serve as jurors even though they have
opinions on the merits of the case, as long as the opinions held
do not influence the jurors in reaching their verdict under
proper instructions from the court. The statute provides indi-
rectly for the impanelling of more intelligent jurors by remov-
ing one of the old common law disqualifications.
In 1845 the statute was amended by a further provision that
" City of Cape Girardeau v. Hunze (1926) 314 Mo. 438, 457, 284 S. W.
471; accord, Priddy v. Mackenzie (1907) 205 Mo. 181, 103 S. W. 968, al-
though the case is lacking in historical accuracy.
' Ter. Laws p. 447; sec. 7; R. S. Mo. (1825) p. 630, sec. 36.
" Under the former law, persons who had formed opinions were disquali-
fied. See R. S. Mo. (1825) p. 630, sec. 36.
R. S. Mo. (1835) p. 463, sec. 16.
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persons who were "kin to either party to any such cause, within
the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity" were incompe-
tent. 90 The law is substantively the same today.91
The clear wording and meaning of the statute may be the
causes for the relatively few cases which have arisen under it.
There appears to be but one case in which the statute has been
invoked to bring about the discharge of a person summoned as
a witness. In that case the court ruled that where members of
the panel had been subpoenaed as witnesses for the plaintiff,
they were properly discharged by the court under the statute. 2
The courts have referred to the statute occasionally in ruling
on the competency of persons who possess opinions on the case.
A juror, summoned in a cause, who was a newspaper reporter,
who had heard of the injury resulting in the lawsuit, and who in
fact had written up the story for his paper, was held competent
when he stated that what he might know of the facts from hear-
say would not influence his opinion. The court recognized that
hearing the case might recall the facts to the juror's mind, but
because of his statement that he could judge the case fairly, he
was nevertheless held cbmpetent. 3
However, where jurors have sat or heard testimony in cases
involving substantially the same facts, and where as a result
they possess opinions as to the merits of the case on which they
have been summoned, they are held incompetent even though
they assert that they will undertake to render a fair verdict.
The courts refer to the statute"4 in concluding that such jurors
possess opinions on material facts which are at issue.r
Even when a juror has heard the result of the case in a former
trial or when from other sources he has gotten a definite impres-
sion, he has been held competent if it is clear that his impression
will not close his mind to the evidence. 6  "The opinion which
R. S. Mo. (1845) p. 628, sec. 12.
'R. S. Mo. (1855) p. 912, sec. 20; G. S. Mo. (1865) p. 599, sec. 22; R. S.
Mo. (1879) sec. 2796; R. S. Mo. (1889) sec. 6083; R. S. Mo. (1899) sec.
3785; R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 7283; R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 6632.
Boyce v. Aubuchon (1888) 34 Mo. A. 315.
Eckert v. St. Lois Transfer Co. (1876) 2 Mo. A. 36.
R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 6632.
Hunt v. City of Columbia (1906) 122 Mo. A. 31, 97 S. W. 955; Barnett
v. Levee District (1907) 125 Mo. A. 61, 102 S. W. 583.
1In re Bowman (1879) 7 Mo. A. 569; Spangler v. Kite (1891) 47 Mo. A.
230.
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renders a juror incompetent must be such as would influence his
judgment." 9 7
Another prohibition of the statute affects persons related to
either party to an action within the fourth degree of consan-
guinity or affinity. Here, again, the statute is very clear, but
nevertheless, it has been cited authoritatively in two outstand-
ing cases.
In Mahaney v. Railroad, a juror on his voir dire examination
stated that the plaintiff was a second or third cousin of his wife.
He was then asked by counsel for the defendant if that relation-
ship would influence him in reaching a conclusion. He an-
swered in the affirmative and was challenged for cause. Then
plaintiff's counsel asked if the juror believed he could try the
case impartially under oath. The juror replied that he could
so try even his own brother. Defendant's counsel then inquired if
he would not be inclined to listen more favorably to plaintiff's
evidence. The juror answered that he might. Thereafter the
court overruled defendant's challenge for cause. Judge Gantt,
in handing down the decision of the Supreme Court, said, "The
finding of a trial court as to the qualification of a juror ought
not to be disturbed unless it is clearly against the evidence. The
trial judge has exceptional advantages to see and know the
jurors. Often the manner and tone of voice may indicate prej-
udice or bias, or the want of either. It would seem, however,
that a court ought to have no difficulty in obtaining jurors of
good repute who are in no way related to either party. While
we would hesitate long before reversing this case for this action
alone, we think it is a precedent not to be followed. This juror
could hardly be said to have that impartiality which the law
guarantees every suitor."8
The opinion is well written. It unquestionably manifests the
legislative intent, and accords with common sense. The decision
assists in the preservation of impartiality in jury trial.
In Price v. Protection Co. the plaintiff objected to four jurors
on the ground that they were related to certain parties who were
insured with the defendant. The court sustained the objection
" Spangler v. Kite (1891) 47 Mo. A. 230, 233; McCarthy v. Railroad
(1887) 92 Mo. 536, 4 S. W. 516; McManama v. Railroad (1913) 175 Mo. A.
43, 158 S. W. 442.
"Mahaney v. Railroad (1891) 108 Mo. 191, 199, 18 S. W. 895.
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and excused each of the persons challenged. The question was
whether or not error had been committed by the court in excus-
ing these jurors under the statute. 9
The Kansas City Court of Appeals held, "While a corporation
cannot be said to have any kindred, yet as such bodies are com-
posed of natural persons who may have such kindred, it would
seem from all the authorities that if a juror be of kindred to
any that is of such a body he is incompetent in a cause where
such body is a party to the record. The four jurors were within
the fourth degree of consanguinity to certain persons who were
insured with the defendant and therefore incompetent under the
statute. It may be proper to here say that it was conceded that
any one who was insured with defendant was, under the law of
its organization, a member thereof, subject to the payment of
assessments for all losses sustained by it."'10
The least that can be said of this case is that the defendant
was in no way prejudiced by the discharge of the four jurors
from the panel. On the other hand, the trial judge, in excusing
them under the statute, was performing a duty. In order to
preserve impartiality in jury trial, statutes such as the one here
referred to may well be liberally construed.
c. Prejudice
While the statute' 0 provides for the discharge of jurors who
are declared incompetent for certain enumerated causes, there
are other grounds for which the court has the right to discharge
jurors when challenged for cause. "It is essential that all causes
as far as practicable should be tried by wholly impartial triers,
and hence, the special designation by statute of certain dis-
qualification creates no limitation against others not so desig-
nated.'1102 "The statute does not speak of the bias or prejudice
of a juror affecting his qualifications, because it is fundamental
in our system of jurisprudence that a juror shall be free from
bias or prejudice, and that the burden shall not be cast upon the
parties litigant to first remove the bias or prejudice of the juror
before, or in addition to, proving the facts in the case. The
R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 6632.
Price v. Protection Co. (1898) 77 Mo. A. 236, 239.101R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 6632.
' Coppersmith v. Railway (1892) 51 Mo. A. 357, 365.
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principle of the rule underlying the statute, and affording the
ground for challenge for cause, is the same as underlies the
doctrine in reference to bias or prejudice of the juror."1010
For purposes of analysis, challenges to jurors because of
prejudice may be considered under three principal headings,
first, prejudice based on a knowledge of facts in the case, second,
prejudice arising out of acquaintance with a party to the action
or a witness, and finally, prejudice resulting from personal bias.
These will be approached in the order in which they have been
outlined, particular stress being laid on prejudice resulting from
personal bias, which has been by far the greatest concern of the
courts. In a discussion of this entire problem, it must be ob-
served, to say the least, that the rejection of a juror for prej-
udice is within the sound discretion of the trial court.10 4
The cases relating to prejudice based on a knowledge of facts
in the case are few in number. In a case in which the plaintiff
was in the real estate business and two of the jurors were found
to be real estate agents, not in business with the plaintiff or in-
terested in the case in any manner, the court held the defend-
ant's challenge for cause properly overruled. The court said, "A
merchant, farmer or servant is not disqualified to be a juror in
an action to which another merchant, farmer or servant is a
party, though the subject-matter may be of peculiar interest to
his calling. Very likely every member of the jury selected had
an interest of his own in the subject of compensation of agents
and brokers, since nearly every person who owns property or
engages in business is compelled at some time to employ agents
to buy, sell or act for him. An interest of that character 'car-
ries no mark of suspicion either of malice or favor' and, there-
fore, is not a disqualification. The objection must be ruled
against defendant. ' "
In a suit for negligent delay in the shipment of cattle, a juror
who was a local freight agent of a road other than the defendant,
and who had to deal in handling cattle shipments with the very
I Theobald v. Transit Co. (1905) 191 Mo. 395, 422, 90 S. W. 354; ac-
cord, Glascow v. Railroad (1905) 191 Mo. 347, 89 S. W. 915; State v.
Chatham National Bank (1881) 10 Mo. A. 482.
'"See pp. 246-249, supra.
" Ballentine & Boone v. Mercer (1908) 130 Mo. A. 605, 608, 109 S. W.
1037; accord, Walker v. Hassler (Mo. A. 1922) 240 S. W. 257.
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same issues which were at issue in this case, was held properly
excused upon objection, even though he stated that he could
try the case impartially and without relying upon his own
knowledge. 0 6 The court reached the opposite conclusion in a
somewhat similar case, however. Where the facts involved a
knowledge of the custom of the grain exchange and the juror
knew of these facts, but said he could be guided by the law con-
tained in the instructions to the jury, he was held competent.17
The only conclusion which may be drawn from these two cases
is that accepting or rejecting a juror depends on the peculiar
circumstances of the case and upon the conduct of the juror
while being examined.
Whether or not a juror will be discharged because of his
acquaintance with a party to the action or a witness, depends
primarily upon the facts of each particular case. The general
rule, however, is that when the juror says that his association
or friendship with one of the parties to a cause or his counsel
will embarrass the juror and for that reason he prefers not to
sit in the case, no error is committed in excusing the juror when
challenged for cause. 0 8
But the mere fact that the juror is acquainted with an at-
torney in the case raises no suspicion of prejudice. "Some of
the blder practitioners at the bar could scarcely appear before a
panel of jurors without meeting acquaintances among them and
it would be a novel idea that the fact of such acquaintanceship
should be held up as a ground for challenge for cause."' 10  In
fact, in a case in which a number of jurors were excused when
challenged because they knew defendant's counsel, as neighbors,
as members of the same church, or in a business way, but still
stated that they could try the case fairly and without im-
partiality, the court held that the action of the trial judge was
reversible error. The court suggested that the mere acquaint-
ance of counsel and jurors is not proof of prejudice.11 The
"McFall v. Railroad (Mo. A. 1916) 185 S. W. 1157.
107 Pratt Grain Co. v. Schreiber (1923) 213 Mo. A. 268, 249 S. W. 449.
Oakley v. Richards (1918) 275 Mo. 266, 204 S. W. 505; Vessels v. Light
& Power Co. (Mo. 1920) 219 S. W. 80; Robbins v. Construction Co. (Mo.
A. 1919) 215 S. W. 779; Bright v. Sammons (Mo. A. 1919) 214 S. W. 425.
Vojtka v. Pelikan (1884) 15 Mo. A. 471, 478.
Uo Gardner v. Railroad (Mo. A. 1915) 177 S. IV. 737.
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position taken by the courts in these cases appears entirely
logical.
It has been held that counsel may inquire of jurors whether
or not they have had any dealings with insurance companies,
where counsel have reason to believe that defendant is insured
against liability. Failure to allow counsel to ask questions as to
such a relationship is reversible error.11
The Supreme Court has held that a juror who stated on his
'voir dire that he had known the president of the defendant com-
pany for thirty-five years and that their relations were very
friendly, but that such friendship would not influence his ver-
dict, and that he would be guided by the evidence and the in-
structions of the court, was not incompetent. 1 12 While the trial
court had the opportunity of observing the juror and determin-
ing his qualifications partly by his demeanor, the case seems ex-
treme. The discharge of such a juror probably would not have
constituted error, and it would have eliminated even the bare
possibility of a biased juror on the panel.
A somewhat similar factual situation is found in a recent
case. The juror whose competency was questioned had lived on
the same farm with the plaintiff and before the trial had dis-
cussed the case with a man, who after the trial became the plain-
tiff's husband. The juror stated that he had formed an impres-
sion on the merits of the case, but added that he could try it and
render a verdict free from any opinion he had formed. The ap-
pellate court arrived at the judicious conclusion that "Common
knowledge and experience make it almost impossible for two fel-
low workers, on the same farm, friendly with one another, to
impartially try any issue wherein a fellow worker is suing a
railroad company for personal injuries."' 3
In a case in which a juror testified that owing to his business
relations he wished to keep in the good graces of the defendant,
" Smith v. Cab Co. et al. (Mo. 1929) 19 S. W. (2d) 467; accord, Wilson
v. Spuhler et al. (Mo. A. 1929) 20 S. W. (2) 556; Davis v. Quermann (Mo.
A. 1929) 22 S. W. (2d) 58. Galber v. Grossberg et al. (Mo. 1930) 255 S. W.
(2d) 96. When it appears that defendant is insured against losses, it is
immaterial whether counsel acts in good or bad faith in questioning venire-
men concerning any relations they may have had with defendant's insurer.
Wendell v. City Ice Co. (Mo. A. 1929) 22 S. W. (2d) 215.
Tawney v. Railroad (1914) 262 Mo. 602, 172 S. W. 8.
" Rooker v. Railroad (1922) 215 Mo. A. 481, 485, 247 S. W. 1016.
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but that he could still render a fair and impartial verdict, the
juror was held competent.114
Prejudice resulting from personal bias covers a wide range of
cases including the juror's sympathy for one of the parties,
prejudice for or against certain classes of cases, and prejudice
resulting from personal and family experience in dealing with
a party to the action. Decisions vary materially depending on
the facts of each case.
There is only one case in which the question of sympathy
played an important part in the decision. A plaintiff brought
suit to recover damages for the death of his child, and the juror
admitted his sympathies in such a cause but said he could try
the case fairly. The juror was challenged, and the objection
was overruled. The court said, "Obviously the sympathies which
one entertains for the loss of a child in such circumstances do
not constitute a strong, and deep impression which will close the
mind against the testimony so as to resist its force and combat
its effect. On the contrary, such sympathies are to be regarded
as in the category of light impressions which may fairly be sup-
posed to yield to testimony in a case. The examination of the
juror here discloses that his mind was open so as to enable him
to return a proper verdict under the instructions of the court
notwithstanding his natural sympathy." 1115
The rule referred to in this decision concerning light impres-
sions is an important one, and is frequently used by the courts
in determining the qualification of jurors. That rule will be re-
ferred to hereafter as it is invoked in particular cases.
The general rule concerning prejudice against certain classes
of cases is that if a juror has such a bias, or prejudice, against
the class of cases t9 which the one on trial belongs that his judg-
ment will be warped, he should not be accepted as a juror; but
it ought to appear clearly that his bias is such as to influence his
judgment.1" 6
In a case in which a juror said that he did not think the "city
got a square deal" in the transaction some years previously in
"'Joyce v. Railroad (1909) 219 Mo. 344, 118 S. W. 21.
Albert v. Railway Co. (1915) 192 Mo. A. 665, 675, 179 S. W. 955.
M" cCarthy v. Railroad (1887) 92 Mo. 536, 4 S. W. 516; Parlon v. Wells
(Mo. 1929) 17 S. W. (2d) 528; McManama v. Railroad (1913) 175 Mo.
A. 43, 158 S. W. 442; Vessels v. Light & Power Co. (Mo. 1920) 219
S. W. 80; Johnson v. Electric Light Co. (Mo. A. 1921) 232 S. W. 1095.
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which the defendant company had obtained a franchise from the
city, it was decided that the opinion held by the juror did not
disqualify him from serving in a personal injury case."17
An extraordinary case arose in 1845 when the plaintiff, a
slave, brought an action to obtain his freedom from the defend-
ant. The request of the defendant was denied to inquire of the
jurors if any of them felt bound in conscience to find a verdict
in favor of the freedom of the plaintiff, notwithstanding the
law might hold him in slavery. The court handed down this
significant opinion: "We cannot well conceive how a juror
could be considered as indifferent between the parties, who
labored under the bias supposed by the question. Nor do we
see what objection can be urged against its propriety. An af-
firmative answer does not tend to the disgrace or infamy of the
juror. We know that there are many of our sister states who
do entertain such opinions; they may find their way amongst
us, and so long as slavery is tolerated in this State, our courts
should be clothed with the power of preventing our laws from
being openly set at defiance, and under the pretence of adminis-
tering justice, to permit jurors to trample in the dust the rights
of property of our citizens. No loyal or faithful citizen will ob-
ject to answering the question. He will fully appreciate the
motives which prompt it, and while he laments the cause which
renders such an inquiry necessary, he yields a ready obedience
to the law which prescribes such a test, in order to ascertain his
fitness as a juror in cases involving the right to property of the
species claimed by the defendant in error. ' ' 11
The opinion is well written, but jurors are more reticent to
admit their prejudices than the court believed. The preliminary
examination of jurors shows this trait. Whatever the practical
difficulties may be in discovering the prejudice, the cases are in
accord on the conclusion that prejudice which influences the
judgment of a juror against a class of cases disqualifies him.
The general rule pertaining to cases in which the juror shows
a prejudice resulting from personal or family experience in
dealing with a party to the action is thus summarized by the
Supreme Court: "A juror may also be biased by what he deems
" Richardson v. Railroad (1921) 288 Mo. 258, 231 S. W. 938.
Chouteau v. Pierre (1845) 9 Mo. 3, 6.
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to be his personal interest. In such cases it makes no difference
whether that interest is real or imaginary. It is the state of his
mind which is the subject of the inquiry and in either case the
apprehension of loss or the hope of gain by the result of his
action as a juror is an influence with which the litigant ought
not unnecessarily be burdened."' 1 9
In a case in which it appeared that the juror's daughter had
at one time been injured by the defendant, the juror stated that
the "company didn't do just right in not paying that doctor's
bill," but further testified that this would not influence him in
arriving at a verdict, nor in any way prejudice or bias his
opinion or judgment." The court said, "In the administration
of justice it is vital that those who sit in judgment, whether
jurors or judges, be free from any prejudice or bias that would
in any manner influence them in a decision either upon the facts
or the law." But the juror was held competent, the court de-
claring, "It would seem that his prejudice ought not to dis-
qualify him as a juror, where it does not appear to be a deep
seated feeling or impression sufficient to influence him in passing
judgment upon the facts under the evidence in the case." 120
In the case of Theobald v. Transit Co. in which the defendant
was a street car company, it developed upon voir dire examina-
tion that eight or nine years before the trial the juror had been
thrown off a car. He stated that that fact would influence him,
but also that he would be governed by the testimony and in-
structions of the court and believed he could render an impartial
verdict. He added that he had nothing against this defendant,
but that since his accident he had had a prejudice against street
car companies, which had been removed only during the last
five minutes of his voir dire examination. The Supreme Court
very properly held the juror was incompetent and in doing so
declared, "The streams of justice should be kept pure and free
from prejudice. In the administration of justice, the courts and
all judges, as well as the jurors, should as far as human pre-
caution can avail, be kept free from bias or prejudice." '12
Vessels v. Light & Power Co. (Mo. 1920) 219 S. W. 80, 85.
McManama v. Railroad (1913) 175 Mo. A. 43, 49, 51, 158 S. V. 442.
(1905) 191 Mo. 395, 427, 90 S. W. 354; accord, Carroll v. Railroad
(1911) 157 Mo. A. 247, 137 S. W. 303.
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The decision in the leading case of Billmeyer v. Transit Co. is
worth noting in great detail, for this and the Theobald case are,
perhaps, the two most outstanding cases concerning the quali-
fication of jurors in civil cases in Missouri.
In the Billmeyer case a juror, who was accepted for service,
testified on his examination that he had a prejudice against the
defendant company because it came near killing two members
of his family; that they were injured by its criminal carelessness
and the fact had caused him to entertain a hard feeling against
the defendant which he could not get over in the jury box. He
testified further as follows:
Q. You would go in the jury box having the same feeling,
the hard feeling you think you have the right to have against
the Transit Company? A. I could not get over that.
Q. And it would require the defendant to make a stronger
defense than if the defendant were some other company
where you had not been injured at all by an act of the other
company? A. Yes, sir.Q. In other words, it would require more evidence for you
to render a verdict for the Transit Company than some
other defendant? A. Yes, sir.
Judge Goode, speaking for the Saint Louis Court of Appeals,
said, "That testimony discloses a very strong bias in the mind of
the venireman; not exactly a prejudice in the strict sense of that
word; for he had not prejudged the case, nor formed an opinion
about it. Yet it is plain that he cherished a bitter and resentful
feeling against the defendant which would be apt to prevent a
dispassionate consideration of the case. It is true the juror
swore he did not think his feelings would affect his judgment
and that he could give the defendant a fair trial. But his en-
tire testimony produces that conviction that his conception of a
trial which would be fair to the defendant, embraced the notion
that it would be incumbent on the defendant to clear itself of
blame for the accident by stronger evidence than other defend-
ants in similar actions ought to adduce. Such an opinion indi-
cated a spirit of positive hostility that rendered the venireman
unfit to perform the duties of a juror. The defendant certainly
could not expect, nor likely receive, a fair trial by a man who
would refuse to exonerate it from liability unless it made good
its defense by an extraordinary weight of evidence-by more
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol15/iss3/2
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evidence than would be needed to induce him to excuse some
other defendant. . . The juror challenged in the court below
was not in a mood that left his mind open to a fair consideration
of the defendant's testimony and hence disqualified."122
The cases to which reference has been made set forth fully
and completely the rules concerning prejudice resulting from
personal and family experience in dealing with a party to the
action. Depending on the facts in each particular case, jurors
have or have not been declared incompetent by the courts as the
facts tended to bring the case within one classification or
another.123
It is an established principle of law that when a juror says in
answer to a question that he will decide for one party or the
other if the evidence is evenly balanced, he is nevertheless com-
petent, if the rest of the examination discloses his ability to try
the cause fairly and without bias; but, if instead it appears that
the juror also is prejudiced, then he is incompetent.124
(To be continued.)
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